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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ryan Johnson appeals from his Judgment of Conviction and Commitment,
stemming from a jury finding him guilty of domestic violence with traumatic injury in the
presence of a child. The State alleged and the evidence suggested that Mr. Johnson
was engaged in four, distinct confrontations with his ex-wife, and he claimed he acted in
self-defense. Mr. Johnson asserts that, under the facts and circumstances of this case,
the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous in their
determination of which of the alleged batteries constituted the necessary element of the
crime charged.

Furthermore, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its

sentencing discretion and that his unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years
fixed, is excessive.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Amended Complaint alleging that Ryan Johnson had committed
the crime of domestic violence in the presence of a child (Count I) and attempted
strangulation (Count II), on October 5, 2011, and a second charge of domestic violence
in the presence of a child (Count Ill), occurring the week earlier on September 26,
2011. 1 (R, pp.22-23.) During the preliminary hearing, Melissa Johnson testified that a
verbal argument regarding her oldest son's cell phone became physical when
Mr. Johnson shoved her into the bathtub and started "tossing [her] around" as she was

1

The jury ultimately found Mr. Johnson not guilty of attempted strangulation as alleged
in Count II, and guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor domestic battery in
Count Ill (the September 26, 2011 incident). Mr. Johnson does not challenge his
misdemeanor domestic battery conviction or sentence in this appeal.

1

getting ready for work. 2 (Tr. Prelim, p.7, L.7 - p.10, L.16.)3 Ms. Johnson went on to
describe two more distinct alleged batteries - one occurring in the bedroom, one
occurring in the living room, and an alleged attempted strangulation occurring in the
kitchen area near the back door. (Tr. Prelim, p.12, L.10 - p.24, L.3.) The magistrate
court found probable cause and Mr. Johnson was bound over into the district court.
(R., pp.24-26.)
The State filed an Information charging three counts: Count I - domestic violence
in the presence of a child; Count II - attempted strangulation; and, Count Ill - domestic
violence in the presence of a child, alleged to have occurred a little over one week
earlier than the incidents alleged in counts I and II. (R, pp.27-28.) In Count I, the State
alleged, in relevant part, that Mr. Johnson "did willfully and unlawfully use force or
violence upon the person of Melissa Johnson by restraining her, throwing her down,
slapping her in the face, hitting her on the head, and/or by throwing her into a bathtub."
(R., p.28.)

Prior to trial, Mr. Johnson requested that the district court instruct the jury that
they must be unanimous as to which alleged acts constitute the alleged battery in Count
I, as each act could constitute a separate crime.

(Tr. 2/9/12, p.4, L.13 - p.10, L.B.)

Mr. Johnson argued that "Ms. Johnson, Melissa, has in her statements says that things
occur in the bedroom and they occur in the bathroom and then they occur in the living
room.

There's no allegation that he was dragging her between those in one act."

2

Ms. Johnson testified that she lived in the house with AL., her 16 year-old son from a
previous relationship, C.J., her 7 year-old son, and M.J., her 5 year-old daughter, both
of whom are also Ryan Johnson's children. The Johnsons were divorced; however,
Mr. Johnson was living at the house at the time of the alleged incidents. (Tr. Prelim,
p.4, L. 12 - p.6, L. 12.)
2

(Tr. 2/9/12, p.4, L.21 - p.5, L.2.) Although the prosecutor acknowledged that there were
breaks in between the alleged batteries, the district court ultimately found that a
unanimity instruction was not required and denied the request. (Tr. 2/9/12, p.5, L.18 p.14, L.1.)
During trial, Ms. Johnson testified that as she was getting ready for work on
October 5, 2011, Mr. Johnson started yelling at her about the use of a cell phone, he
came into the bathroom and pushed her into the bathtub, and then he started grabbing
her by the arms and throwing her around in the tub.

(Tr., p.251, L.1 - p.254, L.7.)4

According to Ms. Johnson, Mr. Johnson stopped, left the bathroom, and went into the
dining room. (Tr. p.255, Ls.6-11.) Ms. Johnson then got out of the bathtub and went
into her bedroom. (Tr. p.255, Ls.12-15.)
While she was in her bedroom, Mr. Johnson entered and threw Ms. Johnson
down on the bed, and she repeatedly tried to get up but he kept pushing her down.
(Tr., p.255, L.16 - p.256, L.8.) Mr. Johnson then allegedly held Ms. Johnson down by
the arms. (Tr., p.256, Ls.9-19.) Ms. Johnson testified that she managed to get an arm
loose, grabbed Mr. Johnson's genitals and squeezed "pretty hard," and IVlr. Johnson
struck her in the face with an open hand. (Tr. p.256, L.20 - p.257, L.24.) Mr. Johnson
got off of Ms. Johnson, grabbed her phone, and then left the bedroom moving into the
living room. (Tr. p.257, L.25 - p.258, L.19.)
Ms. Johnson testified that she then followed Mr. Johnson into the living room
asking for her phone back and a verbal argument ensued. (Tr., p.258, L.20 - p.259,

3

The transcript of the preliminary hearing was included as an Exhibit to the Clerk's
Record (R., p.174), and is contained in the electronic file "39870 State v. Johnson
Pre Tran."
3

L.1.) She testified that she then stuck her hand into Mr. Johnson's pocket to retrieve
her phone. (Tr., p.259, Ls.2-13.) Mr. Johnson then allegedly turned around and pushed
Ms. Johnson to the floor, she tried to get up and he pushed her down again, getting on
top of her and holding her hands down. (Tr., p.259, Ls.14-25.) Ms. Johnson testified
that Mr. Johnson then told C.J. (who was on the couch at the time) that he would give
him the phone so that C.J. could call 911. (Tr., p.260, Ls.6-13.) However, Ms. Johnson
told C.J. to go downstairs and he did so. (Tr., p.260, L.22 - p.261, L.4.) Ms. Johnson
then bit Mr. Johnson and he got off of her. (Tr. p.261, L.5 - p.262, L.3.)
Ms. Johnson testified that she then got up, grabbed her phone, and yelled at C.J.
to come upstairs so they could leave. (Tr., p.262, Ls.4-9.) As she was walking toward
the back door, Ms. Johnson testified that Mr. Johnson grabbed her "hoody" and put his
hand on her throat and squeezed. (Tr., p.262, Ls.10-25.) Mr. Johnson allegedly let go
when he could see that Ms. Johnson could not breathe.

(Tr., p.264, Ls.17-21.)

Ms. Johnson and C.J. then left out of the back door. (Tr. p.264, L.22 - p.265, L.2.)
Ryan Johnson testified that, on October 5th , he and Ms. Johnson got into a verbal
argument about his use of AL.'s cell phone. (Tr., p.405, L.8 - p.408, L.3.) Mr. Johnson
testified that while he was standing in the doorway of the bathroom, Ms. Johnson came
after him swinging her arms, attempting to either scratch, or strike him, and he put his
arms up for protection, diverting her swing and pushing her back into the bathtub.
(Tr., p.408, L.10 - p.410, L.24.) He tried to grab her as she was falling so that she
would not be injured.

(Tr., p.410, L.25 - p.411, L.18.)

Mr. Johnson denied striking

Ms. Johnson. (Tr., p.411, Ls.19-20.)

4

References to the bound transcript containing the pre-trial hearings occurring on
February 1 and 8, the jury trial held February 13 and 14, and the sentencing hearing
occurring on April 4, 2012, will be cited as "Tr." herein.
4

Mr. Johnson testified that he left the bathroom and went into the dining room, and
he turned around just as Ms. Johnson began striking him with a metal wind chime.
(Tr., p.412, L.4 - p.413, L.21.)

He testified that he grabbed Ms. Johnson's wrists to

subdue her, she dropped the wind chime, and he let go of her. (Tr. p.413, L.12 - p.414,
L.14.)
Mr. Johnson then continued to the living room, grabbing AL.'s phone on the way,
he sat down on the couch next to C.J. and he began deleting numbers he had
previously called from the phone. (Tr., p.414, L.15 - p.415, L.11.) Ms. Johnson again
came after him trying to pry the phone out of his hands; Mr. Johnson tossed the phone
on the floor, but Ms. Johnson continued to slap and scratch him. (Tr., p,.415, L.12 p.416, L.20.)

Mr. Johnson then pushed Ms. Johnson backwards, she tripped on a

coffee table, and she landed on her stomach. (Tr., p.416, L.16 - p.417, L.23.) He then
got on top of her and pinned her down to keep her from coming after him again.
(Tr., p.417, L.24 - p.418, L.21.)

Mr. Johnson told C.J. to call the police; however,

Ms. Johnson ordered C.J. to go downstairs and he obeyed his mother. (Tr., p.418, L.22
-p.419, L.13.)
Ms. Johnson bit Mr. Johnson on the arm and grabbed his genitals and he got off
of her. (Tr., p.419, L.14 - p. 420, L.6.) Mr. Johnson then went outside and smoked a
cigarette while Ms. Johnson gathered her things and yelled for C.J. to come upstairs.
(Tr., p.420, L.9 - p.421, L.9.) After he came back inside, Mr. Johnson attempted to
speak to his son and, as he tried to get by Ms. Johnson, she again pushed him.
(Tr., p.421, Ls.7-16.) Mr. Johnson then grabbed her by her sweats~1irt, she spit in his
face, and he held her against the wall telling her to stop attacking him. (Tr., p.421, L.10

5

- p.423, L.17.) Mr. Johnson denied putting his hands on her throat. (Tr., p.422, Ls.813.) After he let her go, Ms. Johnson and C.J. left the residence. (Tr., p.423, Ls.14-21.)
C.J. testified that his parents were "yelling" while they were in the bedroom and
he was on the couch.

(Tr., p.482, L.1 - p.485, L. 18.)

He then heard yelling in the

kitchen. (Tr., p.486, Ls.17-22.) C.J. testified that his parents then moved into the living
room where Mr. Johnson said '"I'm not leaving"' - Mr. Johnson pushed Ms. Johnson,
then Ms. Johnson pushed him back, then Mr. Johnson pushed her again. (Tr., p.486,
L.23 - p.488, L.12.) Ms. Johnson fell on the ground and Mr. Johnson put her hands
behind her back. (Tr., p.488, Ls.13-23.) C.J. testified that Mr. Johnson threw his mom's
phone to him and told him to call 911 but he did not do so. (Tr., p.488, L.24 - p.489,
L.25.) He testified that he stayed in the living room until they left. (Tr., p.490, Ls.1-20.)
He did not see anything happen as they were leaving for the car. (Tr., p.490, Ls.18-20.)
C.J. testified that he saw Mr. Johnson spit on 1\/ls. Johnson but he did not see any other
hitting or swinging by either of his parents. (Tr., p.490, L.21 - p.491, L.18.) He testified
that his mom was crying and said, "'Don't break my arm"' when Mr. Johnson had her
hands behind her back on the living room floor.

(Tr., p.492, L.23 - p.493, L.B.)

However, C.J. testified that he never saw anything happen to his mother's neck and that
his mother was also yelling at his father. (Tr., p.495, Ls.11-18.)
As to Count I, the jurors were instructed in relevant part as follows:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Domestic Battery with
Traumatic Injury in the Presence of a Child, as charged in Count I, the
state must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 5th day of October 2011

2.

in the state of Idaho

6

3.
the defendant RYAN LEE JOHNSON committed a
battery upon Melissa Johnson by restraining her, throwing her
down, slapping her in the face, hitting her on the head, and/or by
throwing her into a bathtub
4.

while they were household members, and

5.
in doing so the defendant willfully inflicted a traumatic injury
upon Melissa Johnson, and
6.
the Defendant committed such offense in the physical
presence of a child under sixteen (16) years of age.
(R., p.121.) The jury was provided with a general verdict form, not requiring the jurors
to unanimously determine which of the alleged batteries constituted the battery element
of the domestic violence charge. (R., p.102.) The jurors were also instructed on selfdefense. (R., pp.130-131.) Mr. Johnson was found guilty in Count I, not guilty in Count
II (attempted strangulation), and guilty of the lesser included offense of domestic battery
in Count Ill. (R., pp.102-104.)
The district court that sentenced Mr. Johnson did not preside over the trial but
stated that the court had listened to an audio of the trial. 5 (Tr., p.519, L.25 - p.520, L.2.)
The State requested a unified term of fifteen years, with four years fixed, while counsel
for Mr. Johnson requested that the court retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.517, Ls.17-18, p.524,
Ls.16-18.) Based upon uncharged, unproven allegations contained in the PSI and the
court's belief that the jurors simply misunderstood the attempted strangulation
instruction, the court indicated that it considered Mr. Johnson to have in fact put his
hands on Ms. Johnson's throat and sentenced him to a unified term of fifteen years, with

5

The Honorable William Woodland presided over the trial while the Honorable Cheri
Copsey presided over the sentencing hearing.
7

three years fixed, without retaining jurisdiction.

(R., pp.140-144; Tr., p.527, L.11 -

p.533, L.11.) Mr. Johnson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 6 (R., pp.150-153.)

6

Mr. Johnson also filed a timely Rule 35 motion, seeking leniency, which was denied by
the court. (R., pp.146-149, 155-161.) In light of the relevant standards of review,
Mr. Johnson does not raise the issue of the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion
in this appeal.
8

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Johnson's request for a unanimity
instruction?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in
light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?

9

ARGUMEI\JT
I.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Johnson's Request For A Unanimity Instruction

A.

Introduction
Jurors in Idaho must unanimously agree on a guilty verdict.

Ryan Johnson,

Melissa Johnson, and C.J. all described multiple conflicts occurring in various places in
the house, with short but discernible breaks in between.

Mr. Johnson admitted to

putting his hands on Ms. Johnson on four occasions although he claimed he did so in
self-defense.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the district court was

required to instruct the jurors that they must unanimously agree on which of the alleged
batteries constituted the alleged domestic violence.

Furthermore, as Mr. Johnson

requested the instruction, preserving the issue for appeal, the State has the burden of
proving the district court's error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State
will be unable to do so and this Court should vacate Mr. Johnson's conviction for Count
I.

B.

Idaho Law Requires Jurors To Be Unanimous Where The Evidence
Demonstrates That Multiple, Distinct, Complete Crimes Are Alleged Even If The
Crimes Are Alleged Under A Single Count
Jurors must be instructed on all of the matters of law necessary for their

consideration,

including "instructions on rules of law that are 'material to the

determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132 and quoting State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483 (Ct.
App. 1999)).

Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct the jury that they must

unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt in order for the defendant to be convicted.
10

Id. at 711 (citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267-268 (Ct. App. 2000).) However, "An

instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense
... is generally not required." Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho
13, 19 (1999); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991 ).) Nevertheless, due process
bars states from convicting a person for a violation of a generic category of "crime"
based upon any combination of facts the state sees fit to allege. Schad, at 633. As
Justice Scalia has observed, "We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging
that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday."

Id. at 651

(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.)
In Severson, the defendant was alleged to have murdered his wife by alternative
means - either by suffocating her or by poisoning her.

Severson, at 701.

The

defendant argued that the district court was required to instruct the jury that they must
be unanimous in determining the means by which he allegedly committed the murder.
Id. at 710. In rejecting Severson's argument, the Idaho Supreme Court found "the trial

court in this case was not required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on
the means by which Severson killed his wife" because he "was charged with the single
act of murdering his wife." Id. at 712. Furthermore, the Court reasoned,
Although the evidence showed that Severson could have murdered his
wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not indicate that
separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus
occurred. The very nature of the crime of murder eliminates this
possibility. Absent evidence of more than one instance in which Severson
engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to unanimously
agree on the facts giving rise to the offense.
Id. The Court recognized that the defendant could not be convicted of the single charge

of murdering his wife on more than one occasion; thus, the district court did not err by
failing to give a unanimity instruction. Id.
11

However, Idaho Courts have long recognized that a unanimity instructions is
necessary where separate crimes, requiring proof of distinct unions of mens rea and
actus reus, are alleged, even where the separate crimes are alleged in one count. The

ultimate question is whether each alleged incident was part of a single course of
conduct.

State

v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,414 (1986). As the Major Court noted, the

distinct between whether a course of conduct constitutes one or multiple offense is
important as,
to charge a defendant with two offenses when only one was committed
violates the defendant's right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const. amend.
V, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with
one offense when more than one was committed can prejudice the
defendant "in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a
conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate
offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the
defendant to double jeopardy." Criminal Procedure, § 19.2(e), p. 457.
Id. (emphasis added).

In Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of appeals held
that the "act or acts" language contained in Idaho Code § 18-1508 ("Lewd conduct with
a minor child under sixteen"), does not "allow for a continuing course of conduct
element.

Rather, the legislature's use of the plural is a recognition that a series of

sexual contacts by different means which occur as a part of a single incident, i.e., a
continuous transaction without significant breaks, are to be charged as a single

count of lewd conduct."

Id. at 266 (emphasis added).

Based upon the evidence

presented at trial, the Miller Court found that the defendant was alleged to have
committed six separate acts of manual to genital contact and that trial counsel was
deficient in failing to request a unanimity instruction (although the court found there was
no prejudice). Id. at 267-269.

12

Furthermore, in State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997), the Idaho Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that his double jeopardy rights were violated
based upon his being charged with and convicted of both lewd conduct and infamous
crime against nature, as each act of fellatio performed on the victim were separate and
distinct. The Court found,
The first sexual assault took place on J.S.'s bed. The second assault took
place on J.S.'s couch. The amended information clearly required proof of
these different facts. Further, other events occurred in between these acts
of sexual assault. After the first assault, J.S. was pulled off the bed and
thrown onto the couch where Bush told J.S. he wanted J.S. to engage in
fellatio. J.S. refused and was pushed to his knees and Bush tied a t-shirt
around J.S.'s face. Bush again placed J.S. on the couch and tied his arms
behind his back with a cord. It was after these events that the second act
of sexual assault occurred. Bush then again placed J.S.'s penis in his
mouth for five to ten minutes. These facts appear to demonstrate that
there were two separate and distinct sexual assaults committed on J.S.
Id. at 34.

Similarly, in State v. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673 (1992), the Court found no

double jeopardy violation where the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape, as
the evidence showed that despite the fact that each act occurred in the same bedroom,
the defendant left the bedroom between each act and jury was properly instructed they
had to consider each alleged act separately. Id. at 675
Thus, while Idaho law does not generally require jury unanimity of the underlying
facts supporting an element of the crime, where one crime is alleged to have been
committed by alternative means and where the defendant is alleged to have committed
separate and distinct criminal acts, Idaho law requires unanimity even if the acts are
alleged in a single count.

13

C.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Give A Unanimity Instruction, As
Requested By Defense Counsel, Because Mr. Johnson Was Alleged To Have
Committed Separate And Distinct Acts Of Battery As An Element Of The
Domestic Violence Contained Charge In Count I
Mr. Johnson does not assert that whenever the State charges a defendant with

domestic violence, the jury must be unanimous in their determination of which act
constituted the underlying battery (i.e., by restraining, slamming, hitting, etc.). However,
the

evidence presented at both the preliminary hearing and during the trial

demonstrated that each of the batteries alleged in this case were not part of a
continuing course of conduct, and unanimity was required. The evidence presented at
the preliminary hearing demonstrated that there were multiple alleged acts, each
separated in time (albeit a small amount of time) by one of the Johnsons moving into
another room. (Tr. Prelim, p.7, L.7 - p.24, L.3.) The State's Information alleged, in both
the conjunctive and the disjunctive that the battery occurred in multiple ways, i.e., "by
restraining her, throwing her down, slapping her in the face, hitting her on the head,
and/or by throwing her into a bathtub." (R., p.121.) All three of the witnesses to the
disputed events described separate occurrences in their trial testimony. Ms. Johnson
described pushing, grabbing by the arms and throwing around in the tub, in the
bathroom (Tr., p.251, L.1 - p.255, L.7), then pushing and holding down in the bedroom
(Tr., p.255, L.10 - p.256, L.18), followed by pushing down and restraining in the living
room (Tr., p.258, L.17 - p.262 L.3), and finally grabbing and choking near the back door
(Tr., p.262, L.4 - p.264, L.21).

Each of these events was divided by discernible

intervening time periods, where both she and Mr. Johnson went into different rooms and
engaged in other behaviors. ( See generally Tr., p.251, L.1 - p.266, L.1 (Ms. Johnson's
testimony regarding the October 5, 2011 incidents).)

14

Mr. Johnson testified to four separate incidents of physical contact between he
and Ms. Johnson (bathroom where Ms. Johnson attacked him, he put his arms up in
defense, she fell into the bathtub while he tried to catch her (Tr., p.408, L.10 - p.411,
L.20), in the dining room where Ms. Johnson attacked him with a wind chime and he
grabbed her arms to subdue her (Tr., p.412, L.4 - p.414, L.14), in the living room where
Ms. Johnson was slapping and scratching him trying to retrieve the cell phone, where
he pushed her backwards and got on top of her trying to subdue her (Tr., p.414, L.15 p.418, L.21), and finally near the back door where Ms. Johnson again pushed him and
he held her against the wall telling her to stop attacking him finally ending when he let
her go and Ms. Johnson and C.J. left (Tr., p.421, L.7 - p.423, L.21).) Again each of
these events was divided by discernible intervening periods of time where the Johnsons
were physically separated and doing something else. (See generally Tr., p.405, L.8 p.423, L.21 (Mr. Johnson's testimony regarding the October 5, 2011 incidents).) Even
C.J. testified that the "yelling" was occurring in various rooms of the house.

(See

generally, Tr., p.482, L.1 - p.496, L.4 (testimony of C.J.).)
Like the lewd conduct statute (I.C. 18-1508) examined in Miller and found not to
contain a specific course of conduct prohibition, nothing in the battery statute or
domestic violence statute (I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-918) suggests that the legislature
intended to criminalize domestic violence as a "continuing course of conduct." While
Severson stands for the proposition that where the defendant could necessarily only
commit the crime alleged once, the jury is not required to unanimously determine which
alleged acts constitute the actus reas, Miller stands for the proposition that where the
defendant could commit the alleged crime multiple times, the jury must be unanimous in
their determination of the defendant's actus reas if the '"conduct constituted separate,
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distinct and independent crimes."' Miller at 267 (quoting State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,
33-34 (Ct. App. 1997) (applying this standard to determine whether double jeopardy
would bar conviction for multiple alleged crimes). Reaching this determination '"requires
an inquiry into the circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the "intent and
objective of the actor."'" Id. (quoting Bush at 33-34 (in turn quoting State v. Major, 111
Idaho 410,414 (1986)).)
Thus, unlike the charge in Severson (or in State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970
(2008) (unanimity not required as to whether the defendant committed the murder
herself or aided and abetted another) and State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 (2010)
(unanimity not required in determining which of the parties to an alleged conspiracy
committed which act in furtherance of the conspiracy)), Mr. Johnson was essentially
alleged to have committed multiple batteries, each of which he could have been held
liable for.

He defended each of these alleged batteries by claiming he was acting in

self-defense. Thus, while some jurors may have found that Mr. Johnson committed a
battery in the bathroom, others may have found that the battery in the bathroom was
justifiable, while still others may have found the State failed to prove that a battery
occurred in the bathroom at all.

The same can be said for each of the other three

alleged acts. While perhaps not as obviously problematic as the scenario warned of by
Justice Scalia in Schad ("We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging that
the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday."

Schad at 651

(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.)), the facts of this case separate, distinct, alleged batteries, with discernible time periods in between, and a
claim of self-defense - demanded a unanimity instruction. Thus, the district court erred
in failing to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous in their determination of which
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of the alleged batteries constituted the necessary element of the domestic violence
charge in Count I.

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt
"If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial,

appellate courts shall employ the harmless error test a1iiculated in Chapman [v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)].

Once the defendant meets his initial burden of

showing that a violation occurred, the State then must demonstrate to the appellate
court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to
the jury's verdict." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). As noted above, the jury
heard testimony from Mr. Johnson, Ms. Johnson, and C.J., indicating that up to four
separate incidents occurred on October 5 th , 2011, and Mr. Johnson testified that he was
acting in self-defense. The State will be unable to show, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the twelve jurors who deliberated and found Mr. Johnson guilty of domestic
violence but not guilty of attempted strangulation for the October 5 th events, as well as
guilty of a lesser included offense for the domestic violence charge alleged to have
occurred a week earlier, would have still found Mr. Johnson guilty in Count I had they
been required to unanimously find which of the alleged batteries constituted the actus
reus for that charge.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of
The Mitigating Factors That Exist In Tl·1is Case

A.

Introduction
Mr. Johnson was acquitted of attempted strangulation; however, based upon the

district court's belief that the jury must not have understood the attempted strangulation
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elements

instruction,

and

based

upon

uncharged,

unproven

allegations

that

Mr. Johnson had placed his hands on an ex-girlfriend's neck on multiple occasions, the
district court, in essence, "aggravated" 7 Mr. Johnson's sentence. Mr. Johnson asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to use due caution in concluding
that Mr. Johnson attempted to strangle Ms. Johnson, and by failing to adequately
consider the mitigating factors that exist in this case.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In
Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Mr. Johnson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of

fifteen years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Johnson does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Mr. Johnson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

7

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120

Mr. Johnson uses the term "aggravation" as an explanation that the district court
sentenced him to a longer term than the court otherwise would have sentenced him.
Mr. Johnson recognizes that his sentence is within the statutory maximum and does not
use the term "aggravation" as a description of either an illegal sentence or as that term
is used under the federal and some states' sentencing guideline jurisprudence.
18

Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coasso/o, 136

Idaho 138 (2001 )).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within
the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989), (citing Associates

Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603 (Ct.App.1987)). "A sentencing court may, with
due caution, consider the existence of defendant's alleged criminal activity for which no

charges have been filed, or where charges have been dismissed." State v. Wicke!, 126
Idaho 578, 581 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added); CJ U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148
( 1997) (finding that a trial court may consider alleged criminal conduct for which a
defendant has been acquitted provided the court finds the conduct to have occurred by
a preponderance of the evidence.)
During the sentencing hearing, counsel for Mr. Johnson argued that the jury likely
believed the testimony of C.J., who testified that he never saw anything happen to his
mother's neck despite the fact that both Mr. and Ms. Johnson agreed he was present,
and asked the district court to retain jurisdiction based, in large part, upon the fact that
Mr. Johnson accepts responsibility for the role he played in the confrontation and his
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willingness to participate in treatment. (Tr., p.518, L.7

p.525, L.14.) Counsel noted

that from the first time she met with Mr. Johnson, he expressed a desire for treatment
both for his domestic violence issues and for his drug issues. (Tr., p.523, Ls.11-24.)
Indeed, Mr. Johnson recognized that he '"should have never let it get to that point or
gotten physically involved in the way [he] did. [H]e should have left immediately when
the altercation began."' (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) 8
Mr. Johnson's witnessed an appalling horror as a child. When he was six-yearsold, he saw his step-father beat his 12-year-old step brother so badly that he went into a
coma from which he never emerged, dying seven years later. (PSI, p.8.) His mother
was convicted of crime for failing to report the abuse, and Mr. Johnson was taken away
first to live when his "'alcoholic' grandparents" and then to live in foster care. (PSI, p.8.)
Mr. Johnson first used alcohol at age 12, marijuana at age 14, and methamphetamine
at age 15. (PSI, pp.114-115.)

He participated in a drug court program in 2009, but

relapsed and had only '"brief moments"' of sobriety until 2011, when his use decreased,
although he was on "spice" when he committed the instant offense. (PSI, pp.13, 23.)
Despite his difficult upbringing, Mr. Johnson acknowledged, "he is an adult and
understands that his childhood 'does not dictation his choices

'"

(PSI, pp.8-9.)

Furthermore, he stated, 'I am responsible for a domestic violence. I will be accountable
and was wrong for my choices'" and further stated that he absolutely needs to get
batterer's intervention treatment.

(PSI, p.23.) The domestic violence evaluator who

interviewed Mr. Johnson concluded that his primary problem is substance abuse but
that participating in a 52-week domestic violence batterer program might be helpful and

8

Citations to the "PSI" in this brief refer to the electronic file "39870 State v. Johnson
PSI."
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was recommended.

(PSI, p.26.)

During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Johnson again

took responsibility and apologized for his actions, and he demonstrated insight into how
his actions harmed C.J., through his witnessing of the altercations. (Tr., p.525, L.20 p.526, L.22.)
While certainly not the only factor considered, the district court focused on the
attempted strangulation allegation and prior uncharged and unproven allegations of
strangulation, 9 despite the jury's verdict acquitting him of the that charge, in crafting its
sentence. (Tr. 4/4/12, p.527, L.9 - p.534, L.12.) In pronouncing sentence, the district
court stated the following:
First, on the guilty verdict by the jury, I find that you're guilty of
Count One as well as Count Three. With regard to the attempted
strangulation, I have only had one conviction for an attempted
strangulation. Having listened to the testimony, I doubt very seriously it
was because of [C.J.]'s testimony. It's the - I have problems with the
attempted strangulation statute. Juries have problems with it They
expect that there's going to be much more evidence tl1an there ever is in
an attempted strangulation. In fact, the - not just the police reports, but
also the reports from the hospital indicate that there were marks on her
throat which substantiated her testimony. So I don't think it had anything
to do with [C.J.]'s testimony at all.

As the prosecutor pointed out, the things described by both women
are remarkably similar. In both cases he puts his hands around their
throat and squeezes.
Now, the reason that the legislature decided to treat attempted
strangulation differently is there is a recognition amongst people who deal
in domestic violence, there is a big difference between someone who
pushes and shoves or someone who slaps and someone who puts their
hands around a woman's throat and tries to choke her. The difference is
that you have to actually be looking at the person in most instances, so
you know what it is you're doing.

9

These allegations were made by an ex-girlfriend who was the victim of a prior battery
committed by Mr. Johnson and who was interviewed by the police and the prosecutor
as a potential I.R.E. 404(b) witness. (PSI, pp.7, 10-11, 96, 98-107.)
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As I said, however, juries have problems with the elements of the
crime. And I very - I only had one where the person was actually found
guilty.
So the mere fact that he was acquitted on that does not change the
fact that the - both - both women describe remarkably similar activities
and there was physical evidence to at least suggest that at least some
portion of her version is correct.
(Tr., p.527, L.11 - p.529, L.13.)
While the district court clearly considered other factors (see Tr., p.529, L.13 p.532, L.24), the court's own belief that the jury, who heard all of the evidence, was
simply confused by the jury instructions and were, therefore, wrong in their acquittal on
the attempted strangulation charge demonstrates an abuse of discretion. The jury was
instructed that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Johnson
"willfully and unlawfully" "choked or attempted to strangle" Ms. Johnson.

(R., p.123.)

The jury was further instructed that "An act is 'wilful' (sic) or done 'wilfully' (sic) when
done on purpose or with knowledge of the consequences.

One can act wilfully (sic)

without intending to violate the law, to injury another, or to acquire any advantage."
(R., p.124.) The state presented expert testimony from Dr. Lee Binion who described

the difference between choking (something caught in the windpipe) and strangulation
(caused by external compression), the biological mechanics of strangulation, and the
potential results of strangulation. (Tr., p.355, L.2 - p.379, L.20.) Most importantly, the
jury heard from C.J. who testified that he never saw anything happen to his mother's
neck despite being present when the alleged attempted strangulation occurred.
(Tr., p.482, L.1 - p.496, L.4.) In short, there is simply nothing in the record to support
the district court's conclusion that the jury misunderstood the instructions that they were
given. The district court's belief that Mr. Johnson was guilty cannot substitute for that of
the jury's belief that he was not guilty.
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The district court's spurious conclusion that the jury did not understand the
attempted strangulation jury instruction (and implied conclusion that the jury disbelieved
C.J. and either disbelieved or did not understand Dr. Binion), demonstrates a failure to
apply the due caution required of a Court when considering acquitted conduct. 10 Thus,
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court acted inconsistently with the applicable legal
standards, thus abusing its discretion, when considering the alleged attempted
strangulation as a factor counseling towards the sentence imposed.

Mr. Johnson

asserts that this undue consideration, coupled with the recognized mitigating factors of
acceptance of responsibility, remorse and a willingness to seek treatment (see State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Sanchez, 117 Idaho 51, 52 (Ct. App.

1990); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991)), demonstrates that the district
court executed an excessive sentence.

°Federal Courts are required to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts

1

constituting prior alleged criminal conduct, for which the defendant had been acquitted,
actually occurred in order to use those acts in aggravation under the federal sentencing
guidelines. See U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997). Although the "due caution"
standard is stated in terms of the district court considering uncharged or dismissed
criminal conduct (see State v. Wicke!, 126 Idaho 578, 581 (Ct. App. 1994)), Mr. Johnson
asserts that at a minimum the district court must use "due caution" when considering
acquitted conduct as an aggravating factor under Idaho's unified sentencing scheme.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for Count
I, domestic violence, and remand his case for further proceedings.

Alternatively he

respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court with
instructions that the court retain jurisdiction, to reduce his sentence as this Court deems
appropriate, or to remand his case for a new sentencing hearing in front of a different
district court judge.
DATED this 2 nd day of November, 2012.

~1
JASON G:--PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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